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Introduction 
"Depression is not a natter of incidental abuses, but of an economic 
37stern failing in its main task, of energizing production. It calls, not 
for piecemeal reforms, but for comprehensive treatment of an organic malady, 
ramifying throughout the economic system,"  Prom the time of Malthus and 
his concern over "general gluts" up to the present day, economists have been 
troubled over that phase of the business cycle lcnown as depression. In 
order to understand this term, it is necessary first to comprehend the 
meaning of the term "business cycle," According to Vfesley C, Mitchell, the 
business cycle- is a "type of fluctuation characteristic of economic activities 
2  r* 
organized in the form of 'business economy1 or 'high capitalism,'"  This 
fluctuation causes unbalance, either in an upward or downward direction, 
and these general ups and dovms have a certain regularity, the periodicity 
of a major cycle being about ten years with approximately three minor cycles 
to a decade. Prior to the Great Depression (1929-1937), the shortest cycle 
lasted about two years and the longest about five years, with every third 
cycle being more severe than the others, thus giving evidence of a major 
cycle of about ten years in length. 
Depression, then, is one of the phases of the business cycle, the others 
being generally recognized as the upswing, the boom or prosperity, and the 
downswing or decline. For years before the Great Depression, declines and 
depressions had been characteristic of the American economji, David Lynch 
calls depression "one of the most •normal' attributes of the system behaving 
in an 'abnormal' manner,"^ These disorders apparently are more common and 
1 John Maurice Clark, Social Control of Business, L'cGraw-Hill Book Company, 
New York, 1939, p. ix. 
2 Lesley C. Mitchell, "Business Cycles," Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, 
Vol. Ill, p. 92, Of, Marshall Edward Dinock,  Business and Cipyernnent, 
Henry Holt and Company, New York, 19£3, p. 677. 
3 Clark, op, cit., p. liOo. 
li David Lynch,    The Concentration of Economic Power,    Columbia University 
Press, New York,  19U6, p. 239. 
2. 
more severe in wealtliy economies, such an .America, than elsewhere. Keynes 
calls it "the paradox of poverty and potential plenty." He attributes it to 
the fact thp.t the gap between income and consumption is very large in a 
wealthy community, so much so that a community will have difficulty finding 
investment outlets adequate to make up the difference. If these outlets are 
not sufficient, full employment cannot be maintained because actual output 
will necessarily drop until it equals consumption plus actual investment. 
In modern terminology, the word "depression" has been more clearly and 
precisely defined. Hie process of decline and depression is thought of as 
being in three categories. "Readjustment," the first stage, represents a fall 
in industrial production from zero per cent to 1S> per cent and lasts not longer 
than a year. It may be of two kinds, "general" when the whole economy is affected, 
or "limited" when only a few industries feel a decline. !Ihe socorid stage, 
"recession," represents a fall from 15 per cent to 33 per cent from the peak 
and lasts from one year to eighteen months. A fall in industrial production 
of more than 33 per cent defines the final stage as "depression*" To be 
o 
considered a "depression," the slump must also last at least eighteen months. 
The problem of depression is, in other words, the problem of unemploy- 
ment. If such a problem threatens the United States today, can the 
Government act to dispel it? Should the Government act? If so, when and how? 
It is to these questions that I address myself in this exposition^ 
Theories of Depression 
T/hat causes depressions? The search for the answer ha3 been deep and 
thorough and long, and the results have been varied, some shallow and naive, 
1 Dudley Dillard, The Economics of John liaynard Keynes, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 
New York, 191*8, pTT^ 
2 J. A. Livingston.  "Business Outlook," Greensboro Daily Hews, October 18, 
19^3, Sports Section, p. 9, Col. £• 
some sweeping and exhaustive. Here, I shall consider only the major 
theories which relate to the subject. 
One of the oldest theories is the weather theory* The most prominent 
of the weather theories is the Sunspot theory advanced by W. S. Jevons. 
He claimed that variations in the atmosphere of the sun determine the 
rhythmical fluctuations of industry, and he did find the average cycle 
of sunspots of IO.4.5 years to coincide with the average length of the 
English trade cycle of 10.5 years. According to his belief, sunspots 
affect the weather; the weather affects agriculture; and agriculture 
affects industry and commerce. When a change in the average length of the 
sunspots cycle was accepted by authorities (from 10.45 years to 11-13 years), 
and when a change also occurred in the intervals between economic crises, 
Jevon1 theory seemed paralogical and invalid. His son, H. S. Jevons, tried 
to rescue it by finding a correlation between a 3^ year cycle in solar 
radiation and barometric pressure and a 3^ year cycle of crop yields. 
Correspondingly, he found a tendency for trade cycles to move in seven 
or ten year intervals.  From this he concluded that two or ghree cycles of 
crops were needed to bring about a trade cycle.  This theory is considered 
to be somewhat groundless, and today little is heard of it. 
The basic assumption in Schumpeter' s Innovation theory is that the 
economic system is in a state of equilibrium before innovations take place 
in which all factors of production are fully employed and entrepreneurs 
are making zero profits. Innovations, the creation of something new, such 
as a new method, a new commodity, or a new market, disturb this equilibrium 
and cause an enlarged demand for capital goods. These innovations come 
1 The sources for the following summary of the major theories, with the 
exception of the discussion on Keynes, are: 
James A rthur Eetey, Business Cycles. Prentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 
1950, pp. 155-287. 
Gottfried Von Haberler, Prosperity and Depression. League of Nations, 
Geneva, 1937, pp. 5-U2. 
T 
in waves, and these waves of expansion are financed by bank credit; *nd 
this credit in the hands of innovators allows them to draw the productive 
resources away from the less fortunate by outbidding them in price, thus 
causing a price rise. Additional expenditures by entrepreneurs add to 
receipts of producers of capital goods. Wages will rise and thus increase 
demand for consumer's goods, but output of consumers' goods will fall since 
the factors of production are being drawn into production of capital equip- 
ment. Therefore, consumer prices will rise. All of this results in profits 
for everybody. 
The turning point of this expansion period comes when the increased 
output of consumers' goods hits the market. When the period of gestation is 
over, the level of output will be much higher than before the innovation. 
Even though a fall in prices has been accounted for by the innovators sub- 
sequent to the rise in output, the increased output will still put pressure 
on the factors of production, costs rise, and profits again become zero. 
The end of expansion necessitates the adjustment of the economic system 
to the new levels of costs and prices and the new methods of production. 
Depression is this adjustment period.  To Schumpeter, progress is fluctuation. 
Booms cause depressionsj and these booms and depressions are the way a 
progressive, dynamic society adapts itself to technological change. No one 
could deny that innovations do affect the economic system; and, today, 
Schumpeter's theory is generally accepted as one of the outstanding explanations 
of the business cycle. 
Cassel, like Schumpeter, thinks cycles are essential to progress. 
In his Overinvestment theory, he claims that forces of progress—innovations, 
opening of new countries, population growth—are the moving causes of the 
business cycle. At the beginning of the upswing, the rate of interest must 
w 
be low so that opportunities which start expansion offer excellent prospects 
for profit. This induces businessmen to plan on a large scale; and, since 
such planning is not commonly financed by banks, it calls for issues of 
securities.  This expansion limits the growth of savings by the relative 
rise of wages over profits, because wage-earners save least and profit- 
makers most of all classes of society. This leads to overproduction 
relative to the volume of saving. 
The crisis is felt first in the capital goods industries.  The rise 
in the interest rate causes a falling price for the instruments of production. 
When fixed capital is ready for sale, it must be paid for by those who 
ordered it.  Especially when the long-term projects are complete is there 
a strain on the capital market.  Producers have trouble selling the capital 
goods. When this happens, enterprises are abandoned and banks stop lending. 
Cassel's conclusion, then, is that " we save too little; we spend too much."* 
A pace in the production of capital goods is set that cannot be maintained 
because of undersupply of saving, not because of overproduction of goods. 
According to Spiethoff, the crisis is caused by a shortage of capital, 
not simply a shortage of monetary funds but a disproportion of certain 
types of goods.  There is a shortage and a plenty at the same time. The 
shortage is in labor and consumers' goods. The overproduction is in durable 
goods. New methods of production facilitate an increase in supply. Because 
there is a long interval between beginning construction and the time the 
product hits the market, the increased supply is faced with a constant or 
falling demand resulting from a lack of capital seeking Investment. In other 
1 Evidently, Cassel assumes that businessmen order " machine tools" lacking 
funds with which to pay, or that producers of capital goods make them 
before receiving orders for them. 
2 Estey, op_. cit., p. 168. 
T 
words, the allocation of the factors of production to the various stages of 
production does not correspond to the flow of money.  Capital formation is 
extremely important in the economy. History proves that the greatest fluctua- 
tions in depressions have been in the capital goods industries. This apparently 
corroborates to a great extent the claim of the Overinvestment school—that 
expansion leads to overinvestment, overinvestment leads to overproduction in 
the capital goods industries, and this spreads to other fidlds. 
Underconsumption theories are numerous, some artless and groundless, 
others competent and comprehensive. One crude theory claims that the economic 
system cannot distribute enough" purchasing power to enable the output of industry 
to be sold at a price covering costs, including a reasonable profit. Another 
theory contends that there is a secular trend for the volume of production 
to grow. Population increases, inventions raise output, and additions are 
made to capital stock. Unless the quantity of money increases to create 
purchasing power to absorb the increase in output at stable prices, depression 
will result when commodity prices fall. Still another theory c Ibims that the 
end of the boom comes when goods from new processes begin to emerge. 
One of the leading underconsumption theories is that of J. A. Hobson. 
Unlike others, he believes the costs of production that are paid out in wages 
and so forth are sufficient to buy the whole product of industry. He also 
believes that society can adjust to some saving. Undue saving, though, leads 
to overinvestment in the means of production so as to make the supply of con- 
sumers' goods greater than can be purchased at profitable prices. Contrary 
to the opinion of the overinvestment school, he assefcts that voluntary saving 
can be and is necessarily excessive. The reason is the distribution of wealth. 
The incomes of the po r and the rich are not spent to the same degree; the poor 
snend most or all of their income while the ridh save a greater percentage 
of theirs. The bulk of savings comes from the high income groups and the 
percentage saved increases with an increase in income. As a consequence to 
this saving, productive facilities are increased. This makes business more 
active and leads to an expansion of bank credit and later to a price rise. 
Out of this expansion, further expansions of saving take place. But the 
increase to total income is not evenly distributed; wages lag in prosperity. 
Additions to higher incomes lead to more saving and investing. Since the 
"nropensity to consume" is very inelastic, the volume of consumption is very 
small relative to the increased total income. This expansion leads to over- 
production. When the goods hit the market, they cannot be consumed. In 
simple form, Hobson's theory is this: oversaving leads to overinvesting 
which, in turn, leads to overproduction relative to the volume of consumption 
which is much too small. 
New meaning was cast on the underconsumption school, and the whole of 
economic theory as well, by the revolutionary thinking of John Maynard Keynes, 
In its simplest terms, Keynes1 theory declares that "employment depends on 
investment,"1 Before investigating this causal factor, it is necessary to 
understand Keynes1 terminology. Investment is not buying bonds and securities; 
it is the "addition to the existing stock of real capital assets,"  It includes 
additions to inventories as well as to fixed capital. Saving is the "excess 
of income over consumption expenditure,"^ To Keynes, aggregate investment 
always equals aggregate saving. He arrives at this conclusion through the 
following line of thought, Employment results in the output of goods on one 
hand and the creation of income on the other. Thus, total output equals total 
income. Total income is equal to the income from consumers' output plus the 
income from investment. Saving is equal to the excess of income^over consumption 
1 Dillard, op, cit,, p» 8, 
2 Ibid., p. 60. 
3 Ibid., p. 61. 
expenditure. Therefore, investment must equal saving. 
In summary form, Keynes' theory is as follows. Income depends on employ- 
ment} employment depends on effective demand; effective demand depends on the 
propensity to consume and the inducement to invest. Since the propensity to 
consume is relatively stable, effective demand depends mainly on investment; 
investment depends on the marginal efficiency of capital and the rate of 
interest; the marginal efficiency of capital depends on the expectations of 
profit yields and the replacement cost of capital assets; the rate of interest 
p 
depends on the quantity of money and the state of liquidity preference,      A 
rise in the marginal efficiency of capital causes investment to increase, but 
it may be offset by a rise in the interest rate.    Likewise, an increase in 
the quantity of money may be offset by a rise in the interest rate.    Moreover, 
employment need not rise when investment is increasing if the propensity to 
consume is falling.    A fall in investment means a decrease in income, which 
leads to a decrease in consumption, wliich leads to further decreases in income.-* 
Some theorists find the cause of depression solely in the monetary system. 
According to Hawtrcy, in equilibrium consumers' outlay equals consumers' income; 
consumption equals production; and cash balances and neither increased nor 
diminished.    The upswing is brought about by credit expansion.    By reducing 
the interest rates, banks ease conditions under which loans are made,    -'hen 
banks lend andjnerchants and producers increase their expenditures, consumers' 
income rises.    This is likely to increase c-nsumers' outlay and set up cumulative 
consequences in wliich more cash is released by banks and businessmen.    The 
r-eneral price level rises; and, because of a lag in wages and interest, profits 
are increased and businessmen borrow still further.    It becomes less advantageous 
to hold cash balances--people want more in their pockets—and an ^increase in 
1 Ibid., p. 65. 
2 THd"., pp. U8-50. 
3 Jo id., p. £1. 
the velocity of circulation of the money supply takes place. The crisis 
comes '.Then increased income and outlay of consumers cause a drain of cash 
out of banks. This flow of cash out of the banks when deposits, through 
loans, have been increasing puts pressure on bank reserves and they must 
stop lending. This drain of ca^h starts the downswing. Dealers are dis- 
couraged from investment; orders are reduced; wages fall; demand for goods 
collapses. Hawtrey contends that discount policy and open-market operations 
nay be trusted to bring about the revival. To him, appropriate banking 
policy could remove business cycles. While it is true that banks play an 
important rola, it cannot be concluded that this theory in itself is an 
adequate explanation of depressions* 
The  Psychological theory is not really a theory of causation, but rather 
is advanced as a supplement to 6ther economic theories. The psychological 
factor is a change in expectations, attitudes, and thinking. In order to 
produce for tomorrow, there must be planning for the future. These estimates 
naturally involve an element of chance, since the future cannot be forecast 
with absolute precision. 
Optimism and pessimism are attributes of the cycle. For example, in 
a period of rising demand and production, a producer in a branch of industry 
that has not yet felt the increase is inclined to expect one. Optimism and 
pessimism come in waves, for optimism in one sector leads to optimism in 
others, and the same is true of pessimism. Rather than being causes, then, 
psychological factors are intensifying elements. 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that various theorists hold 
views which oppose each other. For example, some affirm the necessity of 
cycles in a dynamic society while a few declare that cycles can be avoided. 
■ 
Others are doubtful whether declines can be completely avoided but believe 
that depressions can be mitigated. Again, some find the cause in too much 
saving; others claim that too little is saved. Nevertheless, they do agree 
on some points, 7«hile they may differ as to the cause of the crisis, they 
generally concur in their inference that the crisis takes place in the capital 
roods industries. Capital formation, then, is the clue. Likewise, the 
theorists are in accord when they describe the upswings and downswings as 
being cumulative. Once a shift commences, the acceleration priciple works 
to intensify it. 
The Great Depression 
So far, the discussion has been concerned with depression in general. 
Attention turn3 new to one particular depression, the Great Depression of the 
1930's. Chester W. Wright traces the Depression back to World War I. From 
it, the American economy inherited certain maladjustments in cost-price 
relationships.  In the period 1920-21, there was a drastic fall in prices, 
but the general level was still twice as high as the prewar level. Wages 
were very high; and, since productivity had not risen, this meant a maladjust- 
ment between costs and prices. Manufacturing suffered for a while, but 
tiirough technological improvements and restriction of production, it soon 
operated in the black. In residential construction, there was a postwar 
boom. Agriculture was the sickest industry. A continuing high production 
faced a fall in farm prices. 
The period from 1922-2? evidenced a general fise in prosperity. Every- 
one thought eternal prosperity was here to stay. Even though materials and 
wape costs were high, the interest rate remained low enough to stimulate 
expansion in the building industry. The rapid growth of saving and loan 
1 Chester Whitney Wright, Economic History of the United States, LfcGraw- 
ia.ll Book Company, New York, 19U9, p. 770. 
associations and the develonment of markets for real-estate mortgage bonds 
facilitated new construction.  In manufacturing, better methods of production 
increased productivity to offset the high wage rates, tieduced federal taxes, 
lovf interest rates, and high protective tariffs meant bigger profits for 
some industries. Concentration of financial control helned to stabilize some 
industries, but the rigid prices which resulted only meant trouble later on. 
Electric light and power utilities experienced a rapid expansion period. There 
was a large demand for services; and innovations cut costs, which precipitated 
an even larger volume of demand.   Nevertheless., agriculture remained the 
sick branch of the economy. Costs failed to drop along with prices. Surpluses 
had to be sold in declining world markets; yet, the farmers continued to 
increase their production. 
The crisis in the years 1929-33 was, to say the least, unexpected. The 
slow decline of the price level had not been heeded. The top-heavy pyramiding 
of utilities had not been considered dangerous. No attention had been given 
to the sky-rocketing of the stock market. Banks had seen no need to curtail 
loans. The stock market crash was the first conspicuous event leading to 
the depression. Banks failed, properties were foreclosed, enterprises 
closed, unemployment increased. The impact permeated the world. Exports 
decreased and many countries had to go off the gold standard and devalue 
their currencies. World prices dropped; manufacturing output of industrial 
2 
countries dropped 30-50 per cent.  The United States rras affected 
nore than most countries.  In employment, 43 million man-frears^v/ere lost 
1 Ibid., pp. 771-777. The foregoing summary of conditions up to 1929 was taken 
from Wright's account. 
2 Ibid., p. 779. 
3 The following statistics are taken from: 
Temporary National Economic Committee, Hearings. Fart I, pp. 12-70. 
Cf. Dimock, op_. cit., p. 680. 
12. 
between 1929-1938. American workers lost 0l2O billion in wages and salaries 
from 1929 to 1939. In the same period, ''20 billion in profits was lost to 
owners of industry, and $38 billion in income was lost to farmers. To give 
an example of the cumulative effects that a decline generates, the following 
statistics are offered. "In the period from 1929 to 1932, national income 
fell from 083 billion to fltfO billion} salaries and wages dropped from SU9.2 
billion to $29.9 billionj dividend payments from 56 billion to $2,7 billion; 
and farm income from $12 billion to $5.3 billion.... Unemployment rose from 
13 million to 1$ million."1 
Few steps were taken to cure or even mitigate the depression before 
Franklin D. Roosevelt took office as President in March, 1933. Hoover did 
initiate several minor measures, such as supporting some agriculture prices, 
creating the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and introducing the principle 
2 \ 
of deficit spending.  The New Deal objectives were generally these :•> 
1. Improving monetary and banking system—devaluing the dollar, offering 
cheap credit, insuring bank deposits. 
2. Helping the farmer—improving farm methods, raising and stabilizing 
prices of farm products, strengthening of co-operative marketing. 
3. Helping the laborer—work relief programs, Social Security program, 
wage and hour control, encouragement of collective bargaining. 
li. Helping the businessman—National Recovery Administration calling 
for self-government of business by trade associations and maintenance 
of fair labor standards. 
$.    Helping the consumer—holding company control to prevent pyramiding, 
monopoly, and consumer exploitation in public utility field; control 
1 TNEC, Hearings, Part I, pp. 19h, 201. Cf. Dimock, op. cit., p. 681. 
2 Dimock, op. cit., p. 706. 
3 Wright, OD. cTE., p. 782. and Dinock, op_. cit. pp. 708-709. 
■ 
13. 
of security issues; anti-trust enforcementj protection against false 
advertising, 
6. Pump Prining—large public works and regional development programs. 
It must not be concluded that the actual program of the New Deal was as 
clear and precise as the foregoing objectives indicate. Often, while one 
phase of the program tended toward adjustment, another had the opposite effect. 
Some reforms, though desirable, were not timely. It is doubtful that the 
monetary measures achieved their purpose. The important move the Government 
made in the field of monetary matters was to go off the full gold standard 
and devalue the dollar by lil per cent. By doing this, it hoped to ease the 
burden of debtors and to boost prices; and it expected to stimulate inter- 
national trade.  The latter objective was more fully realized than the former; 
domestic prices rose very little, but the cheaper dollars in foreign exchange 
provided a stimulus for American exports until other countries devalued their 
currencies. Accompanying this move was the Silver Purchasing Act of 1931;, 
the purpose of which was to appreciate the value of that metal in excliange 
so that purchases from the United States would be stimulated. In effect, this 
2 
practice did not help the foreign countries, but only hindered them. 
The efforts to alleviate the condition of the farmer emerged in the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933. Under this act, farmers were provided 
with cash income (benefit) payments, financed directDy out of public funds 
but indirectly out of "processing" taxes levied on the processors. These 
payments were conditioned on the farmers' compliance with production control 
plans.* This act was later declared unconstitutional, and than the benefit 
1 Clark, op. cit., pp. U30-U31. 
2 Ibid. 
3 leverett S. Iyon and Victor Abramson, Government and Economic Life, 
Brookings Institution, Washington, 19U0, pp. 913-91ii. 
111. 
payments were tied to the soil conservation program and paid out of general 
revenues.  The main goal of agriculture reform was to raise prices. To do 
o 
this, the "parity price" idea -was adopted.  Along with this, reforms aimed 
at giving more support to marketing organizations, offering loans to farmers 
at low rates of interest, establishing an^'evcr-i-iorn.-.?. granary,"^ and conserving 
^one lands and taking out of cultivation those too poor to provide a living 
for the occupants. Such a program is generally condoned as an emergency 
measure but is condemned as a permanent fixture in the economy. "There is 
too much of a tendency to stress higher prices and ignore the volume of 
output as essential to the farmers' prosperity,,,il 
One of the purposes of the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 
was to initiate reforms in favor of labor. Ifore than anytlxing else, labor 
-.ranted assurance that collective bargaining and the right to organize would 
be respected. This provision was incorporated in Section 7A of the HRA. 
After the HRA was declared invalid, labor's objectives were again realized 
in the National Labor Relations Act of 1?3£. Along with recognizing labor's 
right to bargain collectively, it listed unfair practices of emplo7/-ers and 
set up a National Labor Relations Board to hear cases and to provide for 
elections to determine the proper bargaining agent. Later, a federal wage- 
and-hour act was passed. That labor reforms were highly desirable is not 
doubted, but whether or not they were timed properly is another question. 
I.'any claim that reforms should be initiated in the upswing rather than in 
the depth of a depression, for higher wages would cause even vrorse maladjustments. 
In addition to these reforms, labor was aided by the passage of the Social 
Security Act, which provides for public assistance, old age and survivor's 
1 Clark, op. cit., p. bhh* 
2 Parity prices~"are discussed more fully on page 29# 
3 The building of reserves in surplus years and working them off in years of 
shortage, 
h '.".right, op. cit., p. 786. ■ 
15. 
insurance, and unemployment insurance. Reserves are built up by means of 
payroll taxes to provide for future payments. Clark declares that "this act, 
whatever changes may be found necessary in its specific provisions, may take 
rank as the soundest in principle and the most enduring contribution of the 
New Deal to our economic structure," 
The idea of pump priming and public vrorks was mainly that of John Haynard 
Kernes. Prom his theory he showed the necessity of high rates of consumption 
and investment and used this as a basis for advocating public works, deficit 
spending, and steeply progressive taxation. In simple terms, the meaning 
of his multiplier is that rovernment spending on public works in times of 
depression Trill increase national income not only by the actual amount of 
money spent but by some multiple of it.2 It was this idea that the United 
States Government adopted and tried to put into practice. The program took 
two forms. The Public Works Administration started out with an appropriation 
under the 11RA. F.7A emphasized heavy construction work of a self-liquidating 
type. The Trork was slow and the major cost iras for materials. Never did the 
F.7A employ more than 171,000 workers at one timej yet, it spent almost one 
half of the entire public works appropriations from 1935-19U-0.    On the other 
hand, the Vforks Progress Administration concentrated on short-term projects 
using many workers and cheap materials. V.hereas P.'.rA supplied jobs to small 
numbers in relation to need, the Y/PA averaged over two million on its payrolls.- 
Few would deny that the projects, such as constructing highways and building 
schools, airports, and public buildings, undertaken by these two agencies 
were of permanent value to America as a •■■/■hole. They provided a market for 
1 Clark, op_. cit., p. Utf. 
2 Dillard, op_. cit., p. 53. 
3 Dimock, op_. cit., p. 719* 
labor as well as the products if industry and agriculture. 
To carry out this program of public works, relief work, and outright 
relief, the Government embarked on the practice of deficit spending. Of 
course, a pay-as-you-go plan is more desirable, but there are times when 
borrowing seems justified. The Government wanted to get money into circulation 
and to spend it so that the purchasing power created would multiply. This 
could not have been done within current revenues, and taxing the people 
more heavily would have merely taken money out of circulation. The course 
followed was deficit financing. 
Did the New Deal accomplish what it set out to do, to poll the country 
out of the depths of the Great Depression? Many think it did, but that it 
betrayed liberalism in doing so. Others think that only World War II put 
America back on the road to prosperity. George Galloway summarizes briefly 
the pros and cons of the New Deal in the following manner. 
Assets: 
1. The activities of the CGO, FSA, and WPA accomplished much in the 
way of conserving soil, water resources, wild-life, and forests. 
2. Economic activity had been stimulated through loans to farmers, 
homeowners, and businessmen and through pump-nriming expenditures 
for public works. 
3. It raised labor standards through eliminating child labor, legalizing 
collective bargaining, and by minimum-wage and maximum-hour provisions 
of the Fair Labor Standards Law. 
4. It increased the security of the population through arrangements 
for old-age assistance and pensions, for unemployment compensation, 
and for the clearance of slums and the erection of low-cost dwellings. 
1 George B. Galloway, Planning 
York, 1941, pp. 47-48. 
•jca. Henry Holt and Company, New 
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liabilities: 
1. Many schools of economic thought, each with its own opinion and 
theory, "muddled" the economics of the New Deal. 
2. Its administration of certain programs v/as ?reak and incompetent. 
3. Its policies have often been inconsistent, such as the trust- 
campaign and the NRA exemptions from the Sherman Act. 
U,    It was guilty of pressure-group politics and interest-group planning. 
John lit Clark concludes that "the New Deal has done much to alleviate 
the burdens of depression for those who feel them most severely, both for 
the present and for the future. It afforded an initial stimulus to re- 
covery, but its later effects on that score are doubtful, and its future 
effects contain some positive dangers. ..hatever the fate of particular 
measures, it is an outstanding landmark in the struggle to secure an economic 
system which can justify itself by meeting the essential needs of the people 
who depend upon it." 
Where We Are Now 
Using the foregoing historical facts as background, it is easily 
discernible that the American economy has climbed high on the ladder of 
prosperity from the depression days of the 1930«s on up through World War II 
to the present time.2 Gross National Product was 360 billion in 1933 compared 
with $360.1 billion in 1952. Personal consumption expenditures were $U£ billion 
in A 
in 1933; and 19^2, they were $222 billion. Business spent approximately *2 
billion on new plants and equipment in 1933 compared to $26 billion in the 
last year. Finally, employment in 1933 totaled 38 million including agricultural 
and nonarricultural employment and today the number fainfully employed is 
about 62 million.-3 
2 S-St* nted SJF since 1933 there has been quite a rise in the price 
level. For example, the wholesale price index has risen from fo to no (Ht-Fl-fl'ioo). 
3 The above figures are taken from: ■. _.  *,__. 
Federal Reserve Charts on Bank Credit, Money Rates, and Busxness, Board 
of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, April, im,  pp. 7U, 77, 60, W. 
10, 
The question is, "Where are we now?" Are we in the readjustment phase? 
There is no explicit answer, but there are indicators that show trends. 
Evidences arc that we have passed the peak. 
In 19^2, business spent #26.5 billion on new plants and equipment as 
compared to 027 billion being spent in 1953.  (See supplementary chart No. 1.) 
From chart No. 2, it is observed that declines in iron and steel, nonferrous 
netals, and ir.otor vehicles and equipment account for a decline in the durable 
roods industries; but the difference is more than made up by an increase of 
expenditures in the nondurable poods industries, mining, and public utilities. 
Even though expenditures on new plants and equipment will not reach the 
19^3 level, businessmen do expect 195U to be the second best year. The past 
five years have shown tremendous advancement, (chart No. 3) and there is 
reason to expect investment in capital goods to continue (charts No. li and 
No. 5). From 19li8-19f>2, business spent #115 billion on expansion and moderni- 
zation: t£2 billion of earnings wa3 plowed b?.ck into business, and to this, 
030 billion of depreciation reserves was added5 ■'.&> billion was borrowed from 
banks and $2k billion of bonds and stocks was sold.^ Whereas in the past, 
capital goods expenditures have been for expansion; in the future, they will 
be more for modernizing existing plants (chart No. 6). Scientific research 
and improvements in modern technology 7riU make this obligatory. The automobile 
industry needs to develop gas turbines and higher-compression engines. Low- 
iron taconite ores are in the plans of the iron and steel industry. Ibre 
modern machines are needed for coal mining, and quick canning methods and 
packaging equipment are necessary to food industries. At any rate, the nation's 
1 % study of business indices was made in October and November, and the 
figures have not been revised. 
2 "Capital Spending Continues to Climb," Business Week, No. 1230 (Inarch 28, 
1953), p. 3h. , ' 
3 "Now lboh Vare Plant Expansion?"    Business Week,    No. 1230 (I/arch 28, 1953;, p. 1U1. 
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productive capacity is expected to have increased by 16 per cent by 1956. 
Producers must have diversified products to compete in a tougher market. In 
all manufacturing, businessmen expect to spend $10.1 billion in expansion 
and modernization during 1954, and in all industry (excluding commercial) 
capital goods expenditures should be $20.7 billion (chart No. 5 and No. 7). 
If trouble comes, manufacturers expect to cut expenditures on plants and 
equipment by one third.2 Depreciation allowances, the main way of financing 
this sort of expansion, will serve as a prop under capital spending if a 
decline does come. "Continuous expansion may not prevent a recession or 
3 
cure one, but it will provide a firm cushion in time of stress." 
As far as the residential construction is concerned, 128,500 new houses 
were started in the peak month of the postwar boom. In November, the number 
per month was 86,900. (See charts No. 1 and No. 8.) Compared to $36.6 
billion spent on new construction at the peak of the boom, $34.3 is now being 
spent. Larger down payments and scarcity and higher cost of mortgage money 
are making it more difficult to sell new houses. Therefore, builders are 
discouraged from starting new dwellings. The fact that fewer families are 
being formed also indicates a decline in housing stafcts. This has an 
adverse effect on the demand for consumers' durable goods such as kitchen 
4 
appliances and household furnishings. 
The index of industrial production (1925-39 Z  100) which includes the 
manufacture of durables, the manufacture of nondurables, and mining, has 
declined from 243 in the boom peak to 232 now (charts No. 1 and No. 9).  
1 "Industries' Plans for Capital Spending: Still on a Big Scale," Business 
Week. No. 1231 (April 4, 1953), p. H3. 
2 Ibid., p. 120. . .     , 
3 "Full Steam Ahead," Business Wekk, No. 1231 (April 4, 1953), p. 164. 
4 "Outlook for Business Now," United States News and World Report, vol. 35 
(August 7, 1953), P. 12. 
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At present, the index shows a drop which reflects especially the manufacturing 
of durable goods, such as automobiles, steel, and farm implements. Inventories 
are getting larger; factory stocks are at a high of $46.4 billion. This, along 
with the drop in industrial production, is a danger sign. New factory orders 
at the boom peak were $28.3 billion per month as compared to $22.4 billion 
now (chart No. 1), and factory shipments were $26,9 billion per month as 
compared to $24.9 now. This means that production is outrunning demand. 
Already, this has caused cutbacks and shutdowns in the farm implement industry, 
home appliance industry, and radio and television industries. 
Supply seems to be outrunning demand in the case of wholesale prices, 
for the wholesale price index has taken a dip from 116.5 at the peak to 
111.0 now(1947-49 = IOC). (See chart No. 1.) This index is important because 
it is a composite of the prices, one step removed from the consumer, of many 
industries:  farm products, processed foods, chemicals, fuel and power and 
lighting materials, furniture, hides and skins, lumber, machinery and motive 
products, metals, nonmetallic minerals, pulp and paper, rubber, textiles, 
and tobacco.  Many workers are dependent on these industries for their liveli- 
hood, and price declines here may mean unemployment for some. 
The cost of living index is at a new high of 115.2 (1947-49 -100). Since 
July 1952, apparel and food hove decreased slightly in price; housing has 
increased steadily; and medical care, personal care, and transportation 
have increased. Even though retail prices are at their highest peak, people 
are still buying at a high rate. In 1953, $170 billion is being spent on 
retail sales compared to $164 billion for 1952.3 Yet, at the same time, all 
1 "The End of the Boom Is Official," United States News and World Report, 
vol. 35 (November 13, 1953), p. 31. „„ 
2 "Monthly Business Statistics," Survey of Current Business, vol. 33 
(September, 1953), PP. s-5, s-6, 
3 "Business in 1953," Business Week, No. 12A4 (July 4, 1953), p. 27. 
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retail trade has dipped 3 per cent from last February.  However, consumers 
have been spending more than normal on durable floods. If they cut down on 
such spending, the purchasing power might go into buying more nondurables. 
Some say consumers would spend it on more luxury in living. Others claim that 
it would be saved, and thus cause the ratio of saving to personal income and 
consumption to rise. Now, personal saving is about 020 billion, which is 
8 per cent of disposable income (chart No. 10). This, to some economists, 
is too high. Moreover, a high rate of consumer spending may not necessarily 
indicate a high rat„e of activity in the manufacturing industries behind the 
scenes. Lerchants may draw on their inventories, which would mean less call 
on the factories for output. (Such was the case in l°i*°.) Factories, in 
turn, would live on their stoclcrooms at the expense of their suppliers. This 
would kick back to the raw materials producers, and employment would begin 
to suffer all along the line. 
Ordinarily, the cost of living index, being at its highest peak, would 
be a stabilizing factor; but, when compared with wages, it seems to present 
a cost-price maladjustment. Because of less overtime and shorter hours, 
income of wage earners declined in September and October even though hourly 
wage rates increased. Hourly earnings are at a new high of &L.73 per hour, 
but weekly earnings are #70.lt9 as compared with §72.lU for the peak.^ High 
retail prices put a squeeze on those who are taking cuts in income. In 
addition, an increase in wage rates at a time when sales are slipping may 
mean higher costs, unless productivity increases to an equal degree or more. 
1 "End of the Boom Is Official," 0£. cit., p. 30. 
2 Ibid. 
Escalator clauses in wage contracts lead to rigidity in wngesj and this, too, 
puts 3orae producers in a pinch if the cost of living goes up while sales are 
leveling off or falling. 
Lbre businesses are failing in 1953 than in 1952. Failures in com- 
nercial service, construction, manufacturing and raining, retail trade, and 
vrholesale trade in September, 1953, were 686 as compared to £39 for a year 
ago.  The liabilities of these failures are greater than a year ago, totaling 
^33,817,000 for September, 1953.  Business failures may simply mean that 
the less efficient are being weeded out. However, it may be an indication 
of a general slack in business activity, pointing to a decline in sales and 
profits. These failures not only affect adverse]y the failing businessmen 
and their employees, but their creditors as wall* Tt is clear, then, that 
the impact may spread to many sectors of the economy. 
In November, prices received by farmers dropped to a twelve-year low 
while cost of living expenses for families continued to rise (chart No. 11). 
The parity ratio of 99t  for the month ending November l£, was the lowest 
since 19hl. At the same time, the index of prices paid by farmers rose one 
third of one per cent.^ The farm mortgage debt outstanding is $7.6 billion.** 
Farmers find themselves in a difficult situation when farm income declines 
while the prices the farmers pay are rising. A decline in farm income 
influences particularly the rural areas of the countryj merchants Triio are 
dependent on farm trade see drops in sales and profits. Moreover, sales in 
the farm implement industry will decline further. Changes in agricultural 
production affect not only agriculture itself, but the people who earn their 
1 "Monthly Business Statistics," Survey of Current Business, vol, 33 (November, 
1953), p. a-k. 
2 Ibid. 
3 ""Farmer Outgo Rises, Income Continues Dip," Greensboro Daily News, December,1, 
1953, Section 1, p. 1, Col. 8. „.,„,, 
h  "Financial, Industrial and Commercial Statistics, United States," Federal 
Reserve Bulletin, vol. 39 (November, 1953), p. 1189. 
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living through transportation, processing, packaging, and merchandising the 
fam products. 
In the field of finance, the position of the commercial bank is important. 
Unlike the days of the Great Depression, banks are now a stabilizing factor 
in the economy. The banks are holding mostly short-term government securities 
which serve as good collateral for loans from the Federal Reserve Banks, and 
are in a strong position to extend credit and follow an easy money policy 
if a decline does come. The summer of 1953 evidenced an easing of the money 
market. In June, the Federal Reserve Trent into the open market and purchased 
government securities, an action which put Federal Reserve holdings of 
Covernment securities up to 32J> billion for the first time in history. 
The second step toward an easier money policy was the reduction in member 
bank cash reserve requirements.2 In September, authorities took a third 3tep 
to pump excess funds in the money market through purchases of government 
securities. This pushed excess reserves up to a daily average of v75>0 million 
and bank borrowings fell to an average of $500 iaillion.-' Lbre excess reserves 
encourape banks to lend on easier credit terms. Lower interest rates are an 
inducement for businessmen to borrow. 'Whether businessmen will borrow or not 
is another thing, for they will not do so unless they can foresee a profit. 
In general, trading in the securities market has been slower. Securities 
took a big dip in the summer of 1953, and since then have been recovering 
gradually. Fluctuations in the securities market are chiefly fluctuations 
in spedulation. Various feelings are reflected in the stock market, such 
as the piling up of inventories in some industries and the drop in farm products. 
1 Monthly Letter on Economic Conditions Government Finance, The National City 
Bank of Hew Xork, New York, October, 1953, p. 111. 
2 Ibid. 
3 IBS, 
For example, the stock of Sfrudebaker Corporation dropped 2>; points when the 
company laid off some of its employees* These fluctuations in securities 
may be indicative of businessmen's expectations. 
No account of the present condition of the economy would be adequate with- 
out a word about the fiscal policy of the United States Government. The 
estimated federal expenditures for the fiscal year 19$h were 078.6 billion, 
incurring a deficit of §9»9 billion.1 Congress, in its last session, trimmed 
some of the expenditures so that the deficit is approximately £6 billion. 
Of this amount, about C£l billion is being spent on defense.2 The fact that 
budget expenditures equal 26 per cent of national income illustrates the 
importance of Government in the economy.3 To understand the economic impact 
of all Federal transactions, a picture of total receipts from and total pay- 
ments to the public is necessary. Total receipts from the public include 
068.7 billion for budget receipts, plus 39.6 billion for trust funds minus 
$3.0 billion for intragovernmental transactions minus 30.1 billion for 
seigniorage on silver, thus giving a total income of *75.2 billion. Total 
payments tg the public include #78,6 billion for budget expenditures plus 
■&.3 billion for trust funds minus $3.0 billion for intragovernmental 
transactions minus #0.1 billion for net accrued interest and other noncash 
transactions, giving a total outgo of 581.8 billion. The net outgo of pay- 
ments over receipts, then, is 06.6 billion.** A net outgo is, in itself, 
inflationary. However, because of budget cuts and because the mobilization 
goal is practically achieved, defense spending is showing a downward trend 
from $53.3 billion to $51.5 billion^ and this tends to be anti-inflationary. 
1 The federal Budpet in Brief. Fiscal Year 195h,  Executive Office of the 
President, Bureau of the Budget, p. U. 
2 The tvro preceding figures are estimates since exact figures on appropriations 
seem unavailable. 
3 The Federal Budget in Brief..., 0£. cit., p. 37. - - .- 
h  feid., p. It2. The foregoing statistics are based on the proposed 195k budget, 
5 Trend of American Business," United States News and World Report, vol. 35 
(October 30, 1953), p. 85. 
Yet, defense spending is high and shall, of necessity, remain high. The 
Government pays people to manufacture goods they cannot consume. The money 
comes from taxes and borrowing, whereas if people kept it all, they would 
probably save some of it. Thus, more money is thrown into circulation. 
This is one barrier against a deep depression. In connection with this, 
consideration mist be given to the national debt, which is around 3275" billion. 
It is generally quite desirable to have a balanced budget and pay as you goj 
but often, through the inflationary policy of borrowing from banks, the 
Government can pump mono;/- into the economy when it is greatly needed. With 
the debt as large as it is, proper management of it in times of stress may 
be of great value. 
In sum-.arizing, it can be said that the economy, as a whole, is 3trong# 
19^3 is the biggest boom year in the country's history. There seem to be 
no inherent maladies today as there were in the 1930*s. Yet, the indicators 
point to a decline. Wa have passed the peak, 
".Then Should the Government Act? 
Before discussing the methods the Government could use to repel a 
decline, it is proper first to determine when the Government should act. 
Recalling the three phases of the downswing—readjustment, recession, and 
depression—it seems logical that the Government should not interfere in 
stage one, readjustment. Even if business activity does not continue upward 
but instead levels off, the Gar ernment should not step in. Arthur F. Burns, 
Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers to the President, does not 
consider downturnslike 1926-27 and 19U0-U9 crucial. lb says the problem is 
1 Randolph Burgess: Interview, "Depression? NoJ Readjustment? Yesl" IWLted 
States Hews and 'florid. Report, vol. 35 (December U, 1953;, p. 56. 
not one of minor ups and dorms, but of depression.  Kany factors outside the 
business c:/cle itself, such as seasonal fluctuations and technological 
changes, can cause such ups and dorms. Sone instability is desirable in a 
dynamic economy, for nothing short of a "planned" economy could prevent 
instability. 
Neither should the Government interfere if private enterprise itself 
succeeds in stabilizing the economy. Already, business has shown jiuch success 
in palliating short-run fluctuations through devices such as scheduling 
vacations during slack periods, transferring employees from busy departments 
to slack ones, hiring part-time people at seasonal peals, and producing for 
stock during slack seasons.  It is reasonable to assume, too, that it could 
be helpful in the longer-run. One way is through long-term planning for capital 
outlays. By planning towards le3S concentration of capital in boom periods 
and toward exploitation of the lower cost advantages in slack periods, busi- 
ness can add stability to investment and to business cycles in general.-3 
This presents problems, of course, the problem of putting off expansion at 
a time when consumer demand is high and the problem of modernizing to keep 
up with competition as well as the problem of financing in recession periods. 
As far as debt management is concerned, it is good for businesses if 
they can retire debt in prosperity and borrow in periods of decline.  Here, 
too, there is the problem that the facilities financed through such borrowing 
in slack periods may not be needed. Nevertheless, through increasing debt 
in bad times, business may be able to provide a helpful stimulus. 
Again, better manipulation of inventories would be °5_value* Througn 
1 "He's '.Vatching for Trouble," Business Week, Ho. 12)46 (July 18, 1°53), p. h$* 
2 A Program for Expanding Jobs and Production, Chamber of Commerce of the 
United States, -'ashington, 1953, p. 15* 
3 Ibid., p. 16. 
ii Ibid. t  P« 17. 
refusing to build up speculative inventories, businessmen could prevent 
"inventory recessions" as the one in 19U9,1 Accumulating inventories in 
sloe!: periods and letting them work off in active periods can do much to 
smooth this volatile item. 
Since research is a long-term process, it cannot be stepped up quickly 
or reduced suddenly. Despite the fact that its use a3 a countercyclical 
device is limited, it is important in maintaining and stimulating business 
and consumer demand and consumption.2 Through diversifying products, developing 
supplementary product lines, changing product mixes, strengthening mer- 
chandising, advertising, and sell.ing programs, and seeking nev.' markets here 
and abroad, business can aid in maintaining a high "propensity to consume." 
3usiness alone cannot prevent a depression, and there are times when 
Government aid is desirable. The Employment Act of 19h6 makes the Government 
responsible for combatting a depression. *t states that it is the responsi- 
bility of the federal government "to co-ordinate and utiliac all its plans, 
functions, and resources for the purpose of creating and maintaining, in a 
manner calculated to foster and promote free competitive enterprise and 
the general welfare, conditions under which there will be afforded useful 
employment, for those able, willing and seeking to work, and to promote 
naximnn employment, production, and purchasing power. "3 Under the Act, a 
three-man Council of Economic Advisers was set up, the head of which is now 
Arthur F. Burns. Sfc is their 30b to detect trouble and to act to correct it. 
The Act defines the Government's responsibility to act, but it does not state 
when it should step in. It is plausible to suggest that the Government_is_ 
1 Ibid. 
2 Ibid., p. 18. 
3 THpTo-ment Act of 19U6.    Cf.    Dimock, o£. cit., p. 729. 
first justified in interceding in stage two, recession. If industrial 
production fells off to 15 per cent, the Government 3hould begin to use 
some of its power. Then, if it continues to drop, more vigorous action should 
be taken. 
'"'hat '.Ye Already Have 
•'■liatever the Government might do in case of a recession would be 
supplementary to stabilizing factors already established in the economy. 
Hie Social Security program, enacted in 1935, is one cushion under employ- 
ment. The three main parts of the program are public assistance, unemploy- 
ment insurance, and old-age and survivors1 insurance.  The first, public 
assistance, is financed by general revenues of the Government. Federal 
grants to the states are used to provide old-age assistance, assistance to 
the blind, and assistance to dependent children.2 The purpose of public 
assistance is to give help to those in financial need but unable to work* 
Unemployment insurance is financed by taxes (3 per cent) on employers' 
payrolls in covered occupations—excluding, generally, nonprofit organi- 
zations, governmental units, and firms employing less than eight workers.3 
"Yorkers who are willing and able to work but who cannot find employment 
are aided by this insurance. The purpose of old-age and survivors' insur- 
ance is to provide benefits to the workers' dependents and to the workers 
themselves upon reaching the age of sixty-five. To finance this, the worker 
is taxed lk per cent of his income up to $3,600, and the employer matches 
to 2 per cent 
that amount.  (The rates are scheduled to go up^January 1, 195U.) 
I^rge reserves have been built up during prosperity in the form of 
trust funds and are available to be paid out in slack periods._ Kury 
1 Dinock, op. cit., p. 72lu 
2 Vernon A. KmO,    Government and Business,    Harper and Brothers, flew ior*c, 
1950, p. 582. ~" 
3 Ibid., p. 583. 
vjorkers who are employed but old enough to receive old-age benefits would, 
in case of a decline, retire or be laid off and then fall back on Social 
Security payments. In 1949, 1.5 million drew on unemployment insurance and 
2.75 million drew on old-age and survivors' insurance. 
Some see Social Security as the cure-all for depression; others con- 
sider it one among many measures necessary to combat a depression. Criticisms 
of the program are that it extends the field of government operation too far, 
that accumulation of reserves depresses the economy, that reserves are mixed 
with general revenues and spent, and that the act does not cover enough 
2 
people.  It must be admitted, however, that the payments do two things; 
they create purchasing power where there would be none, and the purchasing 
power created is usually spent immediately, thus stimulating busireess activity. 
Marshall Dimock declares that "the net effect on the stabilization of the 
economy and on depressions, if they occur, is probably as great as any 
public policy that might be adopted."-^ 
A second prop in the economy is the program of farm price supports. 
The Government supports the parity price at 90 per cent on six basic crops— 
corn, wheat, cotton, tobacco, peanuts, and rice. Others are declared "non- 
basic mandatory" and are suprorted at lower percentages. The parity price 
is the so-called "fair" price based on the period 1910-1914. Parity is a 
ratio of the prices received by the farmer to the prices paid by him, using 
those years as the base. If a farmer does not want to sell his crot> at the 
going market price, he can go to the nearest government office and get a loan 
amounting to 90 per cent of the parity price of his cron. He^ puts his crop 
1 Dimock, cp_. cit.. p. 727. 
2 Ibid.. p. 725. 
3 TH3.. p. 727. 
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ut> as collateral. If the market stays down, he can keep the money, and the 
Commodity Credit Corporation has title to the product. If the market moves 
back up, he has the option of payinp back the loan and selling the crop at 
the best price he can p;et. When the Government supports the price of a crop, 
it also has the rip;ht to regulate the production of that crop. One way is 
through acreage allotments, applied by the Secretary of Ap;riculture; and 
another is through marketing auotas voted by the farmers themselves. 
From the above remarks, it is clear that the Government insures a 
certain income to the farm population. Whether farmers per se should be 
helred and whether the parity price system is the answer to the farm problem 
are moot ouestions. But it must be said that in times of depression it does 
provide purchasing oower in the economy that would not otherwise be there. 
Besides supporting farm prices, the Government makes direct loans to 
farmers for operating and capital expenditures. Federal Land Banks and 
rroduction Credit Associations are organized under the Farm Credit Admini- 
stration, The Land Banks deal in long-term loans requiring first mortgages 
as collateral vhereas the Production Credit Associations extend credit for 
one year (renewable) to be used for operating expenses. In addition, the 
Farmers Home Administration makes loans for operating expenses or farm 
ownership, housing and farm buildings, water facility loans, disaster loans, 
and assistance to veterans in acquiring farms. The FHA either makes loans 
itself or insures up to 90 per cent of the borrower's investment in the farm 
2 
on loans made by private lenders,  ________ 
_■ 
1 "How Farm Laws Tie In With Politics," Business Week, No. 12A2 (June 20, 
1953), PP.  96, 98, 103. 
2 The above account of direct loans to farmers was taken from: 
United States Govfirnmr-nt. Or^ani ^t.-ion Manual 195V5A. Federal Register 
Division, National Archives and Records Service, General Services 
Administration, July 1, 1953, PP. 2A8-255. 
Replacing the Reconstruction Finance Corporation is the Small Business 
Administration. SBA is empowered "to make loans to enable small-business 
concerns (ones that are independently owned and operated and which are not 
dominant in their fields of operation) to finance plant construction, conver- 
sion, or expansion, including the acquisition of land; or to finance the 
acouisition of eauipment, facilities, machinery, supplies, or materials; 
or to supply such concerns vdth working capital to be used in the manufacture 
of articles, eouipment, supplies, or materials for war, defense, or essential 
civilian production or as may be necessary to insure a well-balanced national 
economy,"  It also makes loans to businesses and peorle who have been 
injured by floods or other catastrophes. SBA does not lend to farmers or to 
veterans. Veterans' loans are given special treatment under other acts. 
Even in boom times, some public works are expedient; many projects 
cannot be postponed until recession periods. For sxmpls, some water 
projects may have to be started to meet increased requirements for power. 
Moreover, defense areas may necessitate construction of housing and school 
facilities. Spending on public works falls into two categories, civil and 
defense. In 1951, $2.4 billion was spent on civil public worksj and in 1952, 
the amount was $3.4 billion. The estimate for 1953 is again $3.4 billion 
(non-construction costs excluded).  Expenditures are made for such projects 
as veterans* hospitals, public hospitals, housing and community develo-ment, 
schools, agricultural facilities, river basin development and forest preser- 
vation, transportation and communication, and federal government buildings 
and facilities.3 Out of the 051 billion spent on defense, approximately 
1 Smn JMABMI Act, of 19^.  Section 207.  Cf. Loan Policy Statement, 
Small Business Administration, November 16, 1953, P*,^* 
Budget June 3Q. 
1953. United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1952, p. 1183. 
3 Ibid.. p. 1185. 
J3.5 billion (non-construction costs excluded) is spent on defense public ivories. 
Such projects include training and testing facilities, warehouses, troop 
housihg, new bases,  stockpiling, supersonic wind tunnels, research facilities 
for aeronautical research, and expansion and conversion of synthetic rubber 
plants,1    In addition to these works, state governments are now increasing 
their expenditures on works such as school buildings and highways.    These 
public works plus the federal public works and defense spending, conpose a 
huge volume of buying power in the economy.    If they remain high, which they 
undoubtedly will, they will provide a comfortable cushion in case of a general 
decline. 
How Should the Government Act? 
Unlike the conditions prior to the Great Depression, today America has 
many props under economic activity which tend to fortify her against the throes 
of a bad depression. Over and above these devices already established, other 
measures might be employed. 
Private investment and capital formation is very important because 
"any attempt to counterbalance a small percentage decrease in private investment 
necessarily involves a largo percentage increase in public investment." 
Since depreciation reserves are the main way of financing new plants and 
equipment, allowing business a free hand in depreciating its assets may 
encourage them to build and expand. Lower interest rates on borrowed money 
would also be a stimulus. Commercial construction may be encouraged through 
layer interest rates, cheaper materials, and cheaper labor, if labor is willing 
to take a decrease in wage rates. Arthur F. Burns believes strongly in 
1 Ibid., p. 1189. 
2 Galloway, og. cit., p. 19h» 
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construction as a major means of checking a recession, tte believes that "an 
increase in construction—more than in any other type of activity—causes an 
immediate upturn in the number of jobs."-'- 
ISHsewhere in the field of private enterprise, the Government can try 
to stimulate activity by asking business to pile up inventories in slack 
periods and then liquidate them during active periods. This would make the 
inventory factor countercyclical rather than moving rath the cycle. Also, 
the Government can expand its direct loans to farmers, businessmen, and 
veterans. It can lower the interest rates on the loans, lengthen the period 
of the loans, and extend eligibility to more classes of businesses  Such 
a program would be a revival of the idea of the Reconstruction Finance 
Corporation, the purpose of which was "to aid in financing agriculture, 
commerce, and industry, to encourage small business, to help in aaintaining 
the economic stability of the country, and to assist in promoting maximum 
employment and production."2 It was authorized to ptorchase the obligations 
of, and to make loans to, any business organized or operating under the laws of 
any state or the United States. Furthermore, it could purchase the securities 
of, or make loans to, states, municipalities, and public agencies pro- 
vided that the purchases or loans were made to finance specific projects.-* 
In the international field, the Government could help business by making 
guarantees to private business investing abroad—insuring their invest- 
ments. Under programs of economic and military aid, such as Point k$ 
American experts, methods, and machines are sent abroad. Expansion of such 
programs may help maintain the demand for "machine tools."     
1 "He's Watching for Trouble," op_. cit., p. U6. 
2 United States Government Organization I-lanual..., og. cit., p. U51. 
3 ibid., pp. U52-/-.53. 
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Private residental construction now accounts for one third of the total 
construction in the country (chart No. 8). This illustrates the desirability 
of keeping the rate of home building high. The Federal Housing Administration, 
which insures loans to homebuilders, and the Veterans Administration, which 
insures loans to veterans and in some cases makes direct loans, can encourage 
home building in tvro ways. When they insure loans, they can name the interest 
rate to be chargedj therefore, by lowering the interest rates, they can 
stimulate people to borrow. Moreover, by guaranteeing a higher nercentage 
of the amount of the loans, they can motivate lenders to release their funds. 
Vathout tinkering with the value of the gold dollar, the Federal Reserve 
has some tools which might be effective in a recession period.2 The primary 
objective of the Federal Reserve is "to adjust the flow of money so that it 
will contribute to economic stability at high levels of production and employment.nJ 
Federal Reserve tools for controlling member-bank reserves and the money 
supply are three in number—the discount rate, reserve reouirements, and 
open market operations. Member banks can borrow from the Reserve Banks, either 
by discounting no*es of their customers or by offering their own notes, 
secured by readily marketable assets. This borrowing increases member bank 
reserves. By raising or lowering the discount rate, the Federal Reserve can 
make it more or less expensive to borrow. Since banks always lend at a higher 
rate than they have to pay, a change in the discount rate affects, indirectly, 
the interest rate charged to the banks1 customers. 
Within limits, the Board of Ck>vernors of the Federal Reserve System has 
the power to set reserve requirements. Raising or lowering them affects the 
1 Ibid., p. 494. 
2 The sources for my discussion on monetary policy are: 
The Gimst. for Stability,    Federal reserve Bank of rhiladelphla, 1V5U- 
ajgujg Monetary £T%~    What It   Ts  and How It MM*fc     Committee for Economic 
Develc-xient, New Tork, March, 1953. 
3 The Quest  Qg ■?tra"11it-v-  2> £it.»  P*  2^# 
loans and investr.er.ts that the ner.ber banks car. sake,    in increase in reserve 
reqoireca-.ts lirits the ar.o-.mt of loans and investc-aitc a .nerber bank can have 
:■•.-: -----ii:'--,  vrher  as   a decrease  voold """'    HH   0     twite   off-.o-.. 
By going into the open narket and btryinr, securities (Govemrjont 3ectaritien, 
rostly), the Federal ?-eserve increases nenber ban!: reserves.    The net result 
is an increase in ban!-: deposits and an increase in bank reserves.    Indirectly, 
the •otrchases enable banks to expand their loans and investments or to pay off 
an7 debts they ray have vrith the Federal Reserve Banks.    Open market operationa 
ais: affect the interest rates.    3i$rLng Government securities tends to bid up 
the price and thus lower the yield,    -his s-reads to private issues,   fencer 
oanks, too, art-  likel-- to lower the  interest rates  they charge. 
effective recession -clicy depends on the co-ordination of these three 
-. ::ls.    %• lorrerin? the di3c ------  rite,  Ic—orinr reo-rve reo.'iirene--t-,  and 
rzr-ohasi.-- "mill !■■■■!   securities in the open narket,   the --h .Loral 2eserve can 
nake it easier for i-nerei?j 1 harks  to extend credit.    I-Lorre-":-,  n.-.;v.otar7 policy 
-lone is not a panacea. It nest be  rjrsned in con-'unction 77ith  : iher  --ovomnent 
■■: 1   :i ~~ i 
iionetarr neasnre s, along orith fiscal policies  and expanded        .    .:  Tor'.oo, 
. • he employed to counteract a recession,    -n depression, they ngr be expanded 
...jjj  - —.-1 
fiscal policy* is defined in two ways, to include all the items of 
reran, expenditure,  and Beet management of the Federal Govemne.-.t, or to 
inch*   3-rJL-   -h::::? polioiec   oo  s-ending,  taxing,  and debt nsnar--r.G-.-.-  for 
counteracting flnctaatiom in the business cycle.      The discussion is 
concerned mainly xi the latter. 
1 '-'illiaa. J. Sbnltz and C. Lowell Harris::, 
,  ::-" lork, I?'-", -. 75Iu 
American koblic Finance,    :-rentice- 
Deficit spending, though not universally approved, can help in off* 
setting the cumulative downs-wings of a recession. It has been defined as 
"spending by governments in exoess of their receipts, with the difference 
covered by borrowing."  According to Marshall Diraock, there are two justifications 
for deficit spending: -when private snending falls off and government spending 
must take its place to maintain demand, and when government revenues are 
not sufficient to meet depression expenditures and borrowing must make up 
the difference.  This borrowing may be from individuals or banks. If it 
comes from individuals, there is merely a transfer of fundsj and it does 
nothing to stimulate activity unless the funds turned loose had been hoarded. 
On the other hand, borrowing from banks is, in itself, inflationary. When 
the Government sells bonds to the Federal Raserve, new money is created. 
This type of borrowing, then offsets the contracting tendency of money in 
a recession. 
Une way of forcing deficit financing is through tax reduction. Especially 
in the last few years have taxes become extremely important in the economy. 
Every tax absorbs nurchasing power. However, since this purchasing ; ower is 
usually poured back into the national income stream, it is simply detoured 
through Government hands. Whether national income is increased or decreased 
because of taxes depends on the "reproductiveness" of the Governmental 
expenditures.^ If the Governmental expenditures are more reproductive than 
private expenditures would have been, then national income will be increased. 
The effect of taxes on consumption depends on the income brackets of the con- 
sumers and their psychology. Taxes borne by the low income groups tend to 
1 Ibid., p. 755. 
2 Dimock, 0£. cit., pp. 723-724* 
3 Shultz and Harriss, 0£.  cit., p. 231. 
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reduce their consumption.    The sane is true of those with moderate incomes. 
For those with larger incomes,  saving is the elastic feature rather the con- 
sumption.1    Taxes also have an impact on saving.    Saving is retarded by taxes 
when they "rest chiefly upon income vdiich otherwise would be primarily saved, 
reduce the return upon invested capital, penalize the procedure of saving, 
and absorb saved income before it is invested in new enterprise,"2    Likewise, 
any tax that has an adverse effect on saving in the long run also lessens 
investment in new capital goods,-'    Excise taxes, personal income taxes,  and 
corporation income taxes are the ones that have the greatest effect on con- 
sumption, saving, and investment.    Therefore,   it should be the rates of these 
that s!aould be reduced,    % reducing tax rates and maintaining Bovernment 
expenditures through deficit spending, additional money will be pmpped into 
the income stream.    Consumption will be stimulated if the reductions ease 
the burden of the low income groups.    If the taxes reduced are those levied 
on high income groups, the additional money will probably be saved, •■ 
Hoarding will depress activity; but, if the savings are invested, busine33 
will be stimulated. 
Another way of forcing deficit    financing is through spending on projects 
not previously undertaken,    "Pimp priming" is the name usually given this 
sort of spending.    This type of spending nay have several forms,  such as 
relief allowances and public works,    Even though relief payments do put noney 
into circulation,  they should not be used unless absolutely necessary, for 
they tend to lower morale and discourage initiative.    In the field of public 
1 Ibid., p. 232, 
2 TEST., p. 23U. 
3 TEST., p. 237. 
h Ibid.. p, 2hl, 
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works, there are many projects that would be of valuej unlike relief payments, 
public world offer lasting improvements to the country as a whole. Crowded 
schools need to be enlarged, super highways need to be constructed, power 
plants need to be built. Right now, t2aere are $ljj billion worth of plans 
already approved by Congress that could be used.  In one month, Burns 
could bolster highway spending by ftlOO million.2 By increasing federal grants- 
in-aid to the states and local governments, by implementing new regional 
development programs and other civil public works programs, and by increasing 
stockpiling and atomic energy e::penditures, the Government can create job3 
and pump purchasing power into the economy. This purchasing power serves as 
a stimulus to market demand and employment. 
One must not be led to believe that a program of public works presents 
no difficulties. Heavy construction projects must be combined with light 
construction projects.  Planning and scheduling must be done in advance, and 
the projects must be properly timed.'1 This is very hard to do. I-oreover, 
the projedts 3hould not compete with private enterprise so as not to discourage 
private initiative. To be successful, the program must coincide with other 
Government functions such as tax reductions. 
Controversy is widespread over "pump priming" programs. Keynes used his 
contention that economic systems do not necessarily tend toward full employ- 
ment as a basis for advocating constant "pump priming" to achieve the desirable 
objective of full employment. Others claim that the economic system tends 
toward chronic stagnation and thus constant government spending is essential. 
Some say that temporary recovery spending in depression is sufficient._ Still 
1 George B. Bookman, "Small Decline on Horizon," life, vol. 36 (January U, 
2 "Public^orks, The U. S. Plans for Its Future," Tixie, vol. 62 (September 7, 
1953), p. 88. 
3 Dimock, op. ci t., p. 721. 
h  Ibid. 
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another group advocates a countercyclical policy.    Through high tuxes in 
periods of prosperity, surplus financing can be achieved 30 as to allow 
for paying off the debt incurred in periods of depression.    In general, 
it can be concluded that "so long as recession and depressions occur, part 
of the price one must expect to pay for the unreliability of the free enter- 
prise system is deficit spending.■* 
Conclusion* 
Can the Government prevent an economic depression?    Even the experts 
find this a most difficult question to answer.    Burns, himself, is quite 
noncommittal, pledging allegiance to no particular theory and attempting 
to predict nothing about the future.    Apparently, an unqualified answer 
is not forthcoming, 
Ly answer is that the Government can prevent a depression under certain 
conditions and cannot under others.    The necessity of high rates of con- 
sumption and investment toward maintaininc full employment is manifest from 
past experience.    Government spending and stimuli to investment through the 
foregoing measures can do much to maintain a high level of edonomic 
activity.    These Government programs, however, must be well conceived, well 
co-ordinated,  and well timed so that one will not counteract the otter. 
Businessmen and consumers must also do their part.    Of the three types of 
spending—business, consumer, and government—consumer spending is the largest. 
Therefore, no one factor alone is sufficient to repel a serious decline.    Yet, 
if the Government will put forth its efforts vigorously in a recession and 
use its methods to bolster and encourage business activity, and if business- 
men and consumers will co-operate, a depression can be prevented.    On the 
other hand, if efforts fail in stage two, recession, and if industrial^roduction 
• #iniaPpapS#,  I hav. not attempted to dl.eu.th. Tl~ tf the mrseesrt 
Admini.tration becau.. th. official vi.w,  the Economic ^TZLlf.TL. 
President,  ha. not yet been .ent to Oongre...    Neither can jjehaW* 
as thi. incorporate the latest new. in today', newspaper.    To even attempt 
this would necessitate many revisions. 
ilO. 
falls more than 33 per cent, it is doubtful that the Government could prevent 
a bad depression.    Its deficit spending and public works may mitigate it but 
not cure itj  it would run it3 course. 
It can be concluded that the "quest for stability" is everyone fs 
job,   Vfe can have full employment of men and resources if re have the will* 
Only the future can writs the absolute answer* 
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How MANUFACTURERS   DIVIDE THEIR SPENDING BETWEEN 
No. 6 
EXPANSION 
1452. MODERNIZATION 
49% 51% 
I9« 
43% 57% 
\°i 54-56 
38% 62% 
STEEL 
Expansion     1952.    Mockru'izat'o^ 
62% 38% 
1953 
4l°/e 5°>% 
l°l54-56 
2Z% 76% 
AUTOMOBILES 
Expansion   i^z.    nioaermcattcvi 
36% 64% 
1953 
2 8% 72% 
1954- H 
52% 48% 
CHEMICALS 
Expansion   |q^l   Mo<ta«-vuta+»cm 
76% 12.4% 
1453 
71% 29% 
1954- 56 
£7% 3 3% 
^fu'ce      bus-Wss VVeek,  Ap'«•  4-, >95 2> , p. 114- 
No. 8 
CAPITAL   GOODS   EXPENDITURES     « 
Rifl.Ws of Dollars annually |  ^enUons af Dollars ANNUAL^ 
I9H6    f7 
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COMMERCIAL AHDOT^ER 
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TOTAL EXPENDITURES FOR NEW PLANT ANP EQUIPMENT 
Billions of Dollars Annually 28 
o  a^    1        1        *       1 ' ' '—?-, 
1946474ft    49     50     51     52    53   54 
OUTLOOK FOR NEW CONSTRUCTION 
Continental U.S. 1953 nd 1954 
(millions of dollars) 
No. 8 
*g* ny r.ON JTP.UCTION                                                                                  1252 1254 
^ffintial (total, excluding farm) $11,715 $11,225 
New dwelling units •  10,345 9,650 
Additions and alterations     1,104 1,300 
Nonhousekeening  
Nonresidential Building.(total)                                    5,689 5,575 
Warehouses',' offices* and 'loft buildings         740 850 
Stores,  restaurants,  and  gara ges     1,035 1,100 
Other nonr»sidential building     1,€>51 l,b/5 
Fam Construction     1»4W 1»300 
Public Utility(total)     4,430 4,575 
Railroad         £8° %\ 
Telephone and telegraph          o°0 b£ 
^i^!::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::   ™ 300 
Electric light -md power     1,825 1,900 
Gas     1,^-5 ±,Ou 
411 other private —-121 ^-i2^ 
PRIVATE TOTAL   23,430 <u,vw 
^^                                                                                                          551 365 Rerid-ntial w
NonreFidential Building(total)     J»339 4,275 
Industrial     J»™ J'"g 
Educational     x»^ x»xl2 
Hosoital and institutional          -^ ~'j! 
Other nonreridential building         4/0 40 
Military and Naval     1»360 1'*°° 
■Sa-i ::::::::: 3™ *% oewer nd water         1Q, OQO
Miscellaneous  nublic service enterprises          £J° 7 
Conservation and development          A* ,„, 
All other public   11200 11 200 
PUBLIC TOTAL   11,290 U,«JU 
SPAND TOTAL..        , *3*'720 *34'°°° 
% change 
5A from 53 
-4% 
-7% 
18* 
3* 
-2* 
-14* 
15% 
6* 
1* 
-12% 
3% 
-1% 
4% 
-17% 
11% 
4% 
2% 
-34% 
-1% 
-10% 
11% 
-19% 
1% 
-12% 
10% 
8% 
2% 
-10% 
_29j 
-1% 
-2% 
Source: Business  .Veek.  November  21,  1953,  p.  31 • 
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION! 
Fee Cent Ptbqs'iCal Volume , Seasons Uq Adjusted, 1935 -39 - 100 
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Wee: Federal Kgsgrue Bulled, September, 1953, p. 953 
50 51 52 53 
4 
PERSONAL INCOME, CONSUMPTION,AND SAVING 
No. 10 
Department  of Commence Fstimates, Adjusted for   Seasonal Variations 
Annual Rates 
Billions of Polldrs 
3O0 
\qn 1944 IQ46 1946 1950 1962 1954- 
Source;  federal fetr^ Cbotts   on fant< Credit, Mbneq Kates, ctnj Business. Septei*il*i ,1953 p.«bl 
ae 
CONFLICTING SIGNS IN THE ECONOMIC PICTURE      Nal 
Favorable Siqns 
people arf u>o»-kinq 
(total Civiltfriemplo^merfO 
million of person* 
tf» l<B9   IW   IW   W53 
• 
p 
16 
12. 
S 
Production   is    rising 
(6rc65 Rational  Picduct) 
IJ3 
iilli'ons fci del ars 
I I I I M  I I I 
IW W53 
trters liaue more -fc spend 
(disable personal income) 
l*ibiilicrt$ (Bf3ofla«5 
■ 
UNFAVORABLE SIGNS 
Pr«c«j>   Continue h> rise, 
(cousiirner price iwdex) 
Percent r^e 
7 
O'J-Xli 
^ 
J_L 
Farm Income Is DOUJK 
325 
KWo W     1152       «5 
Stock; tflariel Is Off 
CiVie Meuj Mork Times UleeUij Auq£) 
zoo 
Source: The to &8K Times, 
Sept.»3,lQ53, P. B9. (60b 
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